A Question for Sailors

/ A Question for Sailors #261  
That's called Stack-Ranking and yup, it plays out exactly like you've described. Had many good coworkers on high functioning teams leave companies and join us because while their work was solid they couldn't compete with other people on the team who would live at work. I also know many companies where the bottom 9/10 were mandated to be let go even if their work was up to par. I'll give you one guess how that impacts morale.

The good news is that most places now seem to be coming around on the idea but sad to hear that it's still institutionalized in some cases.

Ranking is also used as an excuse, and legal cover, to fire people in expensive western countries and send the jobs overseas...

Recently, I had one day where I was having to calm down a guy who was rightfully ticked off at management and another guy who has been working too much, not pacing himself, putting to much pressure on himself, and had broke down in tears. :(:(:( Twas a very productive day. :rolleyes:

The managers do not have a clue what ranking does to morale and PRODUCTIVITY. When people spend many hours of the day wondering if they will be fired soon, their area sold off, and dealing with mental angst, they are not getting work done. The management that makes these decisions are clueless.

When I think about this stuff, I think of a scene in a Bruce Lee movie where he is trying to teach a student to see. The student is supposed to looking into the distance to see but the student keeps looking at the tip of a pointed finger. The student is looking but missing what should be seen. Management is like Bruce Lee's student. They are focused on the tip of the finger and missing what should be seen.

Later,
Dan
 
/ A Question for Sailors #262  
Back to the USN. :D

Yesterday evening the Wall Street Journal posted this story about the readiness of the USN, Investigators Repeatedly Warned Navy Ahead of Deadly Collisions - WSJ. The WSJ is behind a pay wall so people might not be able to read the report.

Congress and military officers have been warning about the operation temp and training issues and the GAO has issued three reports over the last few years on the subject.



This is what I have been reading for years and I think it is to blame for the USN accidents that have been happening.

The USN has been following the business worlds mantra of Doing More With Less which means less gets done, and if there is not a change in the organization, things that are important simply do not get done. One ends up prioritizing what has to be done, but if there are five things to do, but one can only do three, that means two things are not done no matter their importance. Dong More With Less really should be called Doing More With Less While Leadership Thinks Things Are OK. :rolleyes:

To make it worse, the USN has taken the stupid ranking system that Welsh was using at GE where officers are ranked for performance. If there are 10 officers on a ship, the CO will rank them from 1 to 10 with 1 being the highest. Now all 10 officers might be really good, but the ranking system forces the CO to list the officers from bad to great even if there are no bad officers. The officers at the bottom are in trouble though they might be good officers. I have lived with this sort of stupidity for decades and have seen how destructive it is for an organization. At first, this process works to get rid of the deadwood, but eventually there is no deadwood, and the organization starts loosing very valuable people who simply cannot be replaced.

The USN is operating with less than half the ships but at the same tempo, if not higher, than when the Navy had 600 ships. I have heard "leadership" say that the quality of our ships allows the USN to operate with less ships which is just bovine scat. You can not have one ship in two places. :rolleyes:

Then the navy is forcing sailor to work 15 hour days vs 12 and I think 12 is nuts. I think this is part of the Do More With Less non sense. The leadership sets the schedule with not enough people and resources to really accomplish the mission but the crew gets it done. The crew knows that things did not work well but they got er' done anyway. The leadership says, well that worked, lets see if we can do it again. The crew pulls it off but the ship and crew readiness is slowly degrading over time. Then the leadership says Do More with Less yet again. And the crew pulls it off but at a cost the leadership does not see. This continues until the breakages and failures eventually get to a point that the leadership finally notices. I have watched this at work for years and I think the USN is now getting to the same point.



USN ships are running aground, hitting seamounts, colliding with other vessels, getting hit by other vessels, etc, not because of hacking, but simply because the ships are not being maintained as they should be and the crews are untrained and TIRED.

Later,
Dan

This.

Lock the thread.

You fella's go and put away your tinfoil hats (and colanders).

The Navy is overworked, understaffed, and under trained. Hopefully, with this latest accident, things will get shaken up from the top down, and some of these systemic issues can get corrected.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #263  
//The USN has been following the business worlds mantra of Doing More With Less which means less gets done, and if there is not a change in the organization, things that are important simply do not get done. One ends up prioritizing what has to be done, but if there are five things to do, but one can only do three, that means two things are not done no matter their importance. Dong More With Less really should be called Doing More With Less While Leadership Thinks Things Are OK. :rolleyes:
As a former Army officer, I don't quite agree. The Air Force and Navy senior leadership have opted for new technology over manpower time and time and time again. Remember it was Dwight Eisenhauer who first raised the danger of the "Military Industrial Complex."

The Air Force has the B52, B1, and B2 bombers, the latter being maintained for a mission that no longer exists. Their brass keeps trying to mothball the A10: then we have a conflict and the A10's inflict 70-80% of all ground damage with few casualties and the bar gets reset. The Navy is spending vast sums on manned fighters while all our opponents are investing in missiles and UAV's. The Marine Corps has been whining for 70 years about how underfunded they are, but has a $35 billion Osprey program:, a buddy towed two of his Amtraks throughout the invasion of Iraq, and carried an M9 pistol but didn't have any magazines.

The Army isn't immune from this as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle program showed. But Navy leadership has persistently chosen technology over msnpower. .

As far as the training goes, the LT I spoke with said Surface Warfare officers receive as little as eight weeks of training* before being sent to the fleet, where they are expected to get up to speed via OJT. But the manpower levels and operational tempo keep that from happening. He further stated that ship handling and navigational skills are set as a very low priority for junior officers by their commanders.

* Army Infantry officers attend a 16 week basic course, and many go on to eight weeks of Ranger training and other schools as well.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #264  
As a former Army officer, I don't quite agree. The Air Force and Navy senior leadership have opted for new technology over manpower time and time and time again. Remember it was Dwight Eisenhauer who first raised the danger of the "Military Industrial Complex."
...

As far as the training goes, the LT I spoke with said Surface Warfare officers receive as little as eight weeks of training* before being sent to the fleet, where they are expected to get up to speed via OJT. But the manpower levels and operational tempo keep that from happening. He further stated that ship handling and navigational skills are set as a very low priority for junior officers by their commanders.

* Army Infantry officers attend a 16 week basic course, and many go on to eight weeks of Ranger training and other schools as well.

Actually, I think we agree. :laughing::laughing::laughing: The Navy and Air Force do have very expensive weapon systems, especially compared to the Army, but they also have too keep up with the technology or they/we loose. The M1A Abrams is getting upgrades but the Army is not building new tanks because there simply is nothing really better than what already exists. That is not true for the Air Force, and less so the Navy. The Navy has certainly wasted money on the LCS program which seems to be a very fast target ship since it really does not do anything it was designed to do with any efficiency. And the LCS was first deployed with 50 sailors as part of the Do More With Less mantra. Eventually, the Navy figured out that 50 was not enough and they now have 75ish crew on board.

Expensive weapons systems that eat up the budget do impact how many people one can have operating said systems and this does seem to hit the USAF and USN more so than the other services.

The USN has been doing stack ranking, like the business world, and the damage this has done to the officer corps has been discussed in the USNI Proceeding magazine as well as other places. It is a very corrosive process.

What you said about training a USN officer receives for ship handling and navigation is what I have been reading for years. Some level of OJT is to be expected, and Navies have a history of teaching on board, but it has gotten out of hand which I blame on the more with less mentality. The more or less mentality extends to the Pentagon and civilian leadership which is where the real problem exists.

Later,
Dan
 
/ A Question for Sailors #265  
The LCS, the Navy's own private version of the F35 financial black hole . Simple works, the more complex a device , the lower it's Operational Readiness.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #267  
The LCS, the Navy's own private version of the F35 financial black hole . Simple works, the more complex a device , the lower it's Operational Readiness.
There's a very funny document called, "The snake doctrine," that compares how different branches would approach the task of killing a snake.

Examples:

Military Intelligence: "four of six "snake activity indices" read low."

Special Forces: Win hearts and minds of indigenous snakes. Train them to kill problem snake. File amazingly creative expense account.

Marines: Find a snake and kill it. Locals complain to US embassador it was the wrong snake.

SEALS: Attack snake at dawn, kill snake though two SEALS are wounded. Sign movie deal, "Snakes at Dawn."

Rangers: solitary Ranger crawls in at 2am while snake is asleep, kills snake, and withdraws to cook it and share with squad. Army refuses to confirm or deny.

And Navy: "Gives PowerPoint presentation to Congress on why the Littoral Combat Ship is the most cost-effective approach to killing snakes." :laughing:
 
/ A Question for Sailors #269  
Just saw this article in the Wall Street Journal, U.S. Navy Says Most Seventh Fleet Warships Lacked Proper Certification - WSJ, that says the the majority of the destroyers and cruisers in the 7th Fleet lacked certification for seamanship:

As of late June, eight of the 11 cruisers and destroyers in the Seventh Fleet, and their crew members, weren稚 certified by the U.S. Navy to conduct 杜obility seamanship, or basic steering of the ship, according to U.S. Navy records provided to two House Armed Services subcommittees. The Navy also said that seven of those ships had expired training certification in the areas of cruise missile defense and surface warfare, which test a crew痴 ability to defend a ship or to conduct attacks.

The article does NOT say if the Fitz and McCain had "mobility seamanship" certification but they did say,
Neither the Fitzgerald nor the McCain were certified for the majority of the mission operation requirements that the Navy periodically evaluates.

The Seventh Fleet痴 destroyers and cruisers generally met certification in other areas such as maintenance, communications, navigation, explosive safely and search and rescue.

The basic message is/was:
The U.S. Navy has acknowledged cutting back on certification procedures in the face of growing demand, according to past GAO reports.

The Navy repeatedly has said that increased demand on the Seventh Fleet has resulted in cutbacks on training and certifications. That pressure has only increased in recent months with each North Korean missile or weapons test, as the fleet conducts more exercises and patrols with the same number of ships.

This has been going on for years, the USN got away with it for along time, but eventually it caught up with them. I have read similar things regarding readiness of USAF and USMC air units. I would guess the same applies to USN air units as well.

Later,
Dan
 
/ A Question for Sailors #270  
I've read a similar theme about airline pilots. They know all the ins and outs with all the complicated systems on a modern jet, but they don't know how to fly by the seat of the pants. In other words they are great pilots that don't know how to fly. There have been a couple of crashes where the automated systems at an airport were shut down and there was a crash because the pilot couldn't land without them. Kind of the theme I read here, sailors that don't know how to sail.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #271  
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/ A Question for Sailors #272  
I'm just getting caught up on this thread.

I installed Loran C in helicopters in the early 80s. At that time, it was great for oil rig flights. But not for the open ocean.
hugs, Brandi

Why not? I used it in the early 70's on C-141s over the Pacific with the GLC charts, although it's not as precise as today's navigation tools. It would not work for terminal navigation. There was also Loran D that was more accurate, but shorter range.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #274  
I graduated from a Maritime Academy in 2007 with a USCG 3rd Mates unlimited tonnage license and spent May 2007-February 2017 (just took a shore-side job a few months ago now) as a deck officer on civilian run ships...2007-2011 on civilian manned USN ships (cargo and special mission ships for the Navy are run by civilian mariners, not active duty military) and then 2011-2017 on drillships.

I spent a total of about 3-months on actual USN ships (as a cadet only, 2 destroyers and an amphib) as well as countless hours sailing alongside them (as 3rd and 2nd Mate) during UNREPs and just general navigating in the vicinity of them, here is what I know.

USN ships are manned by an abundance of bodies, I dont recall there ever being less than 6 or so and often times 10+. In my time as a Mate we rarely had more than 3, most often 2 and it was not at all uncommon for me to run the bridge solo. While it might seem having 6-10+ on a bridge makes it safer I would disagree. One trained mariner running the bridge solo will focus on the task at hand while multiple guys on a dark bridge underway at night can very easily fall into complacency, thinking "someone else" is looking out.

The USNS ships I sailed on all had autopilot of course, however none had any sort of auto-nav features...meaning I would enter in the compass course I wanted the iron mike to steer and the vessel would maintain that heading, no further input went into it. It did not account for set/drift, it did not adjust speed up or down, it simply held a compass course. The mariner would need to adjust as required to stay on track, follow the plotted track line, or adjust for traffic. Now I cant say for certain, but I am quite sure DDG's in particular are setup with the same systems, a "dumb" autopilot if you will.

The much more advanced drillships I spent my time on did infact have systems where I could plot a track and tell the ship to follow that specific track. It would adjust heading (to adjust for set/drift) as needed to keep the vessel within X-meters of the trackline, and would actually change heading as needed on waypoints to follow the track. In my 6+ years on those ships we never once used that system for anything other than just testing or "playing around" with it during trials etc. The very idea of putting control of the vessels piloting in the hands of a computer system alone would be crazy to any trained mariner.

Now at this time I need to mention...the sea is FULL of ships and mariners from all over the world. US and European mariners in particular are very well trained and follow the "rules of the road" quite well. A lot of asian, middle eastern, and other places Mariners....not so much. For us a 1 nautical mile CPA (closest point of approach) is acceptable. To a Phillipino mariner? Not hitting another ship is acceptable. So there are different standards.

If I had to speculate here is what I think may have happened. The container ship was infact in an auto-track mode, with a mariner "on watch" that was either sleeping or a few decks down making a sandwich or who knows... The USN ship was underway and saw the cargo ship on its current course/speed and did infact have an acceptable CPA (closest point of approach). The container ship came to a waypoint in its track and on its own made a course change that put itself on a collision course with the Destroyer. Now at this point the only real reason I can see why the Destroyer would not have made the necessary change to avoid collision is that they did not realize the container ship changed course and was now on a collision course. Whether they werent paying attention or what I cant tell you, but if they were maintaining an acceptable CPA the entire time prior to then the cargo ships course change wouldnt have put it into a collision immediately, they would have had time to maneuver.

Maybe the Destroyer tried contacting them via VHF either prior to or during being on a collision course...or maybe they didnt...it doesnt much matter because its very common to try hailing a foreign flag cargo vessel on VHF to discuss passing arrangements and get no response, that isnt something that necessarily raises red flags. USN ships typically contact other vessels via VHF unnecessarily anyway, in my experience it often creates a more hazardous situation when you try discussing arrangements with non-english speaking mariners and is usually better to SHOW them what you want to do with your ship, meaning make a large course change one way or another so its obvious what you're doing, versus trying to talk it out over the radio.

Its hard to speculate just based on the little info Ive read, but ultimately both vessels are at fault when a collision occurs.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #275  
Couple other things to comment on:

"The Fitzgerald's AIS data was not available so its track was not reported publicly" - Ive never, not once, seen a USN ship display their AIS information. I sorta get it...military ship and all. However when you see the running lights and radar signature of a large ship and see no AIS its pretty much a guarantee that its a Navy ship.

"After impact, the freighter's was not immediately aware that it had collided with anything and continued sailing. The ship's crew then realized it had been in a collision and sailed back to try to determine what had happened." - I find this hard to believe. If you hit another ship you'll know. More likely they were panicked and just didnt have their heads on straight enough to turn around immediately.

"For the Navy, investigators are trying to determine why the ship's radar and other sensors did not detect the Crystal in time to take steps to avoid the collision." - these radar systems are useless without a human monitoring them! Sure you can SET CPA alarms, so itll beep at you if it auto tracks a target and determines a CPA <whatever you set. I can tell you right now, we never had radars set to automatically start tracking targets because they cant tell the difference between a ship, a little fishing boat, or just some junk return. If you tell the radar to track targets on its own itll be tracking every dot on the screen and be a total mess. And alarms for <whatever CPA are not just a given...they need to be set and in my experience rarely were. The mariners job is to monitor these radars and make decisions based on the info.
 
/ A Question for Sailors #276  
Navy issues new sleep and watch schedule rules for the surface fleet



In an internal Navy message issued Friday, Rowden said surface fleet skippers will be required to implement watch schedules and shipboard routines that better sync with circadian rhythms and natural sleep cycles.

Such a move aims to give sailors a more consistent and less erratic sleep schedule, resulting in a more rested and alert crew.




Bruce
 
/ A Question for Sailors #277  

Interesting.

In a nod to old-school seamanship, and regardless of any installed radar capability, Rowden痴 message also dictates that maneuvering boards will be used by both the bridge and combat information center for all vessel contacts with an initial closest point of approach of 5,000 yards or less.

Closest point of approach is a nautical calculation used to gauge collision risk.

This seems to imply that the CIC was not being used/or partially used to navigate the ship.

Navy ships steaming in high-traffic areas will now use the automatic identification system, or AIS, which is used to track movement aboard commercial vessels

Surprised they will be turning on AIS.

Much of the article is about sleep and it does surprise me that the surface fleet has been operating the way it has been compared to aviation and submarine units.

Later,
Dan
 
/ A Question for Sailors #278  
// is usually better to SHOW them what you want to do with your ship, meaning make a large course change one way or another so its obvious what you're doing, versus trying to talk it out over the radio.
Great info.

Sailing or under power in Boston Harbor you almost always have a land site so you can tell in seconds if you are going to cross near other vessels. It’s easy to make a distinct change of course so they know what your intentions are.

On a summer weekend in Boston Harbor, other than the pros I assume no one knows ROW and is paying attention. It’s the old joke, I know I’m paranoid, but am I paranoid enough?
 
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